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The Challenge of Jurisprudence:
To Build a Science and Philosophy of Law
by Jerome Hall • Professor at the Indiana University School of Law
0 Jurisprudence, says Professor Hall, is a subject that seems remote from the daily
practice of most lawyers. Most members of the profession dismiss it as academic
and impractical, he says, and yet ultimately the survival of our legal principles de-
pends upon lawyers' building a rational system of law based on truth and rightness
-a philosophical system that members of the Bar understand, not as an academic
subject, but as a system of law that is superior to its competitors in satisfying human
needs and aspirations. This article is taken from an address delivered before the
Indianapolis Bar Association last autumn.
E The challenge of jurisprudence is
ultimately the challenge to live the
fullest, best life of a lawyer. But some
of the subjects I shall discuss will
seem remote from daily practice. To
that extent jurisprudence challenges
accepted notions of the meaning of
the lawyer's vocation. It is a chal-
lenge to re-examine and revaluate
the pattern of legal practice. Certain-
ly it is a fact that many lawyers have
discovered that their participation in
various activities of a jurisprudential
nature is far from being a handicap.
They provide living demonstrations
of the significance which jurispru-
dence can confer on the practice of
law.
jurisprudence is the play of the
speculative mind on law and legal
problems. Its history included the
thinking of the greatest philosophers
in all places and times until, some-
what over a century ago, jurispru-
dence became the dismal science of
modern times, with a corresponding-
ly narrow appeal. But jurisprudence
traditionally and in its recent revival
is an uninhibited adventure in ideas,
the unrecordable flash of creative
mind probing the most difficult hu-
man problems. Accordingly, if, smit-
ten by the sting of an inexhaustible
love of wisdom, we rise above the
inertia of technicality, we can con-
fidently predict that men will con-
tinue to cultivate the soil of juris-
prudence imaginatively in the future
-though temporary blackouts are
not impossible.
Challenge of Jurisprudence
Is Chance To Acquire Knowledge
Recognition of the permanence of
jurisprudence implies certain endur-
ing qualities of human nature which
bring reassurance in times of stress
when men, sensing the limitations of
finite beings, feel as impotent as
sticks tossed on a wrathful ocean of
passion and irrationality. Jurispru-
dence encourages us not only because
it heightens regard for human na-
ture; it is also evidence that our
problems are not entirely new but
are, instead, the perennial difficulties
of horno sapiens. Jurisprudence also
provides a record of the ways in
which the most profound men grap-
pled with these difficulties. In doing
that it comprises a body of knowl-
edge and a methodology by use of
which we can better solve our prob-
lems. Thus the challenge of juris-
prudence, stated from another view-
point, is a challenge to acquire that
kind of knowledge.
The major problems of our times
reveal the clash of sharply conflicting
interests. They are problems whose
solution depends on factual knowl-
edge, the discovery of sound values,
the use of rational methods of inves-
tigation and the threat or applica-
tion of organized coercion. In a word,
they are, basically, legal problems.
That is why the challenge of juris-
prudence addresses itself with par-
ticular emphasis to the lawyer. It
amounts to a challenge to do the best
possible thinking on law and legal
methods and thereby raises the level
and widens the range of professional
skill and influence.
Just as philosophy and science
were born in ancient Greece, so, too,
was jurisprudence. Greek genius
sought the reason of everything. Its
searching mind fused with an incom-
parable sense of beauty so that what
for Eastern peoples was a mass of
isolated information, like geometric
measurements and rules of thumb,
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became in Greece organized knowl-
edge, science, Every science has a
rational as well as a factual aspect.
Without the thread of reason, ex-
pressed in laws, principles and the-
ories, men stumbled along in a crude
trial-and-error method of investiga-
tion. The Greeks created the meth-
ods and the ideas which established
Western science and philosophy and
made them imperishable values of
our culture. So, too, of the jurispru-
dence they left us.
Greek Jurisprudence
Grappled with Major Problems
But jurisprudence 'was not the cre-
ation of a gifted people indulging
in idle speculation. It was also a way,
indeed the most important way, of
grappling with the major problems
o' their times. By the end of the
seventh century B. C., the clash of
interests had already culminated in
revolution. The economic structure
crystalized in large land owners,
peasant farmers, maritime and com-
mercial classes. Their first efforts
to resolve the social conflicts are
represented in the codes of Draco
and Solon (594). But the clash of
interests continued. In addition, con-
siderable information about the var-
ious Greek city-states and about
foreign countries-Egypt, the Near
East, Africa, indeed, about all the
lands bordering on the Mediterra-
nean made it abundantly clear to
the seafaring Athenians that laws
and customs differed widely. The de-
feat of Persia led to the rise of Athens
as a great naval power, supreme in
Greece and set on its course of em-
pire. The comrbination of practical
power-politics, the drive for suprem-
acy, the clash of economic and polit-
ical interests, and the gift of specula-
tion set time scene and provided the
stimuli for the birth of jurisprudence.
Socrates is the father of jurispru-
dence and the situation lie had to
meet was symbolized in cynical,
power attitudes expressed in the
dogmas: Might is right. Law is mere-
ly conventional, differing from place
to place. The natural thing to do is
for the strong to bend the weak to
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their desire. Socrates' efforts to refute
this position paralleled the discover-
ies of the earlier scientists. Every-
thing we see about us changes in-
cessantly you can't step into the
same river twice, it was said (even
once, someone added, because it is
(hanging every split second you are
putting your foot into it.) But Greek
scientists had discovered that under-
lying the phenomena of ceaseless
change are certain constants, the laws
of science, not visible entities but
able to be apprehended mentally.
They discovered ultimate truths re-
garding the physical world, the con-
stitution of matter and the processes
of motion and change. Arid so
Socrates, turning thought to human
beings and the needs of a social-
political community, searched for en-
during principles of conduct, abid-
ing values and methods of discover-
ing them and proving their validity.
In the pursuit of his investigations,
he made many discoveries which
Plato, his student and disciple, fixed
permanently in the foundations of
jurisprudence. Plato nurtured the
Socratic seed; and in a brilliant style,
never since even approximated in
philosophical writing, he added his
jurisprudential ideas which have
profoundly stirred thoughtful per-
sons for more than 2000 years. In his
immortal Dialogues the method of
dialectics, the so-called Socratic
method, is elaborated; and lawyers
who have barely heard of Plato have
been the beneficiaries for centuries.
The nature of law and justice is ex-
plored. One of the two or three
greatest trials in all history is pre-
sented. Socrates, condemned to death
by a thoughtless jury, refuses to per-
mit his powerful friends to arrange
his escape. Instead, he chooses death,
extolling the law of his native city
and supplying the ideas which helped
to establish the rule of law as the
distinctive quality of Western polit-
ical institutions. It was Plato, too,
who wrote the first great essays on
administrative law. Aristotle, Plato's
student and disciple, presented a
theory of equity, the classic analysis
of the relations of general prescrip-
tions to the individualizing processes
of government.
Plato and Aristotle were not only
great theorists; they were great re-
searchers as well. Plato's Academy
drafted codes of laws for many com-
munities and Aristotle studied 150
different constitutions. They can
hardly be said to have fully explored
the possibilities of constructing an
empirical science of law. But, for
that matter, we are still largely in the
stage of discussing the prolegomena
of legal science rather than of carry-
ing on the researches necessary to
construct such a discipline. Finally,
it has recently become rather per-
suasive that the basic legal concep-
tions were familiar notions among
the Greeks though, again, in this
branch of their jurisprudence, we
find nothing like the elaborate detail
provided by Austin and his success-
0s.
Greek Thinking
Was Not Departmentalized
It is impossible here to discuss other
Greek contributions to the founding
of jurisprudence, but one additional
point of particular importance must
be noted. The Greeks did not de-
partmentalize their thinking about
social and political problems. What
we call jurisprudence was an integral
part of political science, and ethics
had the dominant role in this disci-
pline. The modern age saw the rise
of specialization with concomitant
increase in certain types of efficiency
purchased, however, at the cost of
understanding the interrelations and
the whole of social-political prob-
lems.
I have said that the Greek dis-
coveries and contributions were not
the creations of idle speculation but
were born of necessity. In fact we
may say that Greek jurisprudence
represents the solution of genius
confronting the major social and
political problems of their times.
Plato and Aristotle studied these
problems in the declining days of
Athens, following the long, disastrous
Peloponnesian wars. The clash be-
tween the democracy and the oli-
garchs was bitter to the point of
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suicidal civil war. The international
situation was acute and threatening.
Finally, the rise of Alexander brought
the promise of world federation un-
der the aegis of Greek culture. East
and west the products of Greek
genius spread. The vast influence of
Greek culture in the Hellenistic Age
is indicated in the fact that Cicero
studied under Greek teachers, later
to become a major link between
Greek civilization and the rising star
of Imperial Rome.
The Romans were not original
thinkers, but they were gifted legis-
lators and administrators. Roman
rule expanded until it encompassed
most of the then-known world. Al-
though brilliant generals and well-
trained armies were necessary to the
Roman conquest, it was sound law,
reaching heights of professional
competence that have never been
excellhd, and equal administration
of that law which held many diverse
peoples together for centuries. Here,
too, if time allowed, some relevancies
for the present American situation
might be indicated.
Greco-Roman Civilization
Influenced Whole Western World
We are told that Greece and Rome
perished and the implication is-
what is the use of law and jurispru-
dence? But did Greece and Rome
really die? The whole of Western life
is permanently stamped with the seal
of Greco-Roman civilization. Greek
genius left its island home only to
win a world to its way of scientific,
philosophical and artistic thought.
Rome no longer rules by force, but
the greater part of the civilized world
lives by Roman law and its deriva-
tives. The question therefore is not
one of biological life or death-
Greeks and Romans lived on after
the glory had departed. It is rather
a question of sustaining the gift of
creativeness, of nurturing the highest
values, of providing conditions that
permit the human spirit to flourish
in its still untapped potentialities.
In short, as Socrates put it, the ques-
tion is not life, but a good life. For
us, the question is how can law con-
tribute to that end,
From what I have been saying, the
challenge of jurisprudence may seem
to be a challenge to participate in
the building of a sound international
law. World problems are obviously
important, but their: solution does
not require every country lawyer to
engage in international affairs. Still,
the chances of his contributing to
their solution should not be ignored.
For if the American lawyer becomes
a legal scientist and philosopher, the
impact of the profession will be felt
everywhere. Not the least important
step in that direction is the role of
the lawyer-philosopher as a teacher
in his particular community, how-
ever small it may be or remote from
world highways. The formation of a
sound American opinion regarding
the problems of jurisprudence, even
though the average layman never
hears that word, may well become
the most important single factor in
contemporary world history.
But beyond any world-wide influ-
ence or speculation is the daily life
of the average practitioner and the
increase in professional effectiveness
and enjoyment which jurisprudence
offers him. The challenge of juris-
prudence extends to every aspect of
the lawyer's vocation. It brightens
his more reflective hours with the
fundamental questions that have ap-
pealed to thoughtful lawyers through
all the ages, though they have been
minimized in the recent past by the
compulsions and advantages of spe-
cialization. (May I add, parentheti-
cally, that just as it is possible to see
all of life through the window of
the law, so, too, is it possible for a
specialist to give his particular
knowledge a very wide perspective
and a deep foundation). The oppor-
tunities to expand legal horizons and
make the practice of law more signif-
icant through the use of jurispru-
dence are unlimited.
Consider, for example, the system-
atization of the law. If we say that
this problem lies in the field of ana-
lytical jurisprudence, many lawyers
are apt to assume that we are talking
about some esoteric bit of academic
lore. But if it is pointed out that we
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are here concerned with the problem
of finding relevant law, the practi-
cality of the question immediately
becomes evident. A great part of the
lawyer's working life is spent in
searching through digests and ency-
clopedias for cases in point. It is diffi-
cult work which becomes ever more
discouraging as the courts of fifty
jurisductions pour out their massive
products. The whole business would
be impossible and its future utterly
hopeless were it not for the fact that
law is susceptible of systematic ar-
rangement, that doctrines and prin-
ciples subtend millions of rules,
making the search for apt cases man-
ageable. The familiar subjects of the
substantive law and the distinctions
between that and procedure indicate
some of the broad lines of classifica-
tion. And, within each subject,
propositions of varying generality
provide the instruments whereby the
numerous rules and the cases can be
organized and found with more or
less success.
The success is less frequent -and
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complete than it should be. Indeed,
what assurance have you after long
painstaking research that very im-
portant cases have not completely
eluded your investigation? The law-
yer must rely on the staffs of pub-
lishers. He must rely on an old,
makeshift, classification of the law.
One need not be unappreciative of
the publishers' efforts to be skeptical
of the professional literature they
have provided. Nor are the publish-
ers to be blamed. The plain fact is
that the Bar has not interested itself
in the development of a legal system
nor has it cultivated the aptitudes
necessary for sound organization of
the law.
In this regard the Anglo-American
lawyer has lagged behind the Con-
tinental lawyer who inherited the
systematic treatises of the modern
Roman law. On the Continent this
is manifested in codification which,
joined to a looser grip of precedent,
makes the practice of law less ardu-
OtiS.
My purpose is not to insinuate
that code systems are superior to case
law, nor do I think a revival of the
Field-Carter debates on that subject
is called for. That issue has been
clouded by the myth pervading aca-
demic circles, at least, that the basic
methbds of legal thinking are quite
different, that the Continental law-
yer reasons deductively from the
broad propositions of his code while
the common lawyer reasons induc-
tively from case to case until he
constructs the required principle. It
is impossible here to set forth the
reasons for believing that this ac-
count is mythology. And it is more
pertinent to point out that the com-
mon law abounds in doctrines and
principles no less than do the civilian
systems. This suggests that the differ-
ence lies in the articulation and or-
ganization of these generalizations
rather than in basic methods of ana-
lyzing legal problems or deciding
cases. It also implies that, quite apart
from official enactment of codes, the
effort to systematize the case law
would make the authoritative ma-
terials more usable. There is, in
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addition, the aesthetic pleasure to
be derived from an appreciation of
the architecture of the legal order as
well as the increased efficiency in
making one's way through the lab-
yrinthian byways of a great legal
system. These are joys and utilities
which any lawyer can experience.
There are serious international
consequences of the common lawyer's
disinclination to organize his law.
His contacts with foreign lawyers are
rendered difficult, and his participa-
tion in international efforts to unify
law are limited. Beyond that extends
the curtailment of American influ-
ence on other cultures. The Romans,
by contrast, left their law in the
convenient form of the Justinian
Code; and its successors, the Swiss
and German civil codes and the
French and Italian penal codes, have
been adopted throughout the world
from Turkey to China and Peru.
This nation, despite its strategic posi-
tion, is unable to exercise a similar
influence on world culture because
its law in foreign eyes is a formless
mass of countless rules piled helter-
skelter in terrifying Gargantuan di-
mensions. I do not mean to suggest
that the imitation of American law by
foreign countries should be pressed.
Our influence, .if any, may be better
extended in assisting others to de-
velop free institutions in ways con-
genial to their own culture. To do
that, however, we must improve our
competence to communicate the
character and significance of Ameri-
can legal experience.
"Legal Sociology" Implies
a Factual Science
I turn now to the challenge of juris-
prudence with regard to a factual
science of law, a sociology of law,
which is not concerned with system-
atization of legal precepts but with
the functioning and effects of law,
the interrelations of legal and non-
legal institutions, and the like. In
short, legal sociology carries the con-
notation of science in its ordinary
meaning; it is or, rather, will be, if
it is ever brought into existence, a
distinctive factual science.
It is widely recognized that the
better state legislatures and the na-
tional Congress have increasingly
relied on factual information in the
study and drafting of legislation-
though even here, that is sporadic
and superficial. It will probably be
granted also that some judges, espe-
cially in constitutional cases, lean
heavily on the findings of factual re-
search. Many lawyers have heard of
the pioneering Brandeis brief, which
emphasized facts rather than the
cases. Yet all that seems remote from
the- daily work of most lawyers. I
grant that, but nonetheless submit
that factual research relevant to law
and legal problems should be a
serious concern of the thoughtful
practitioner.
In order to indicate a perspective
on the question quickly, I point to
our brethren in the medical profes-
sion. I do so without intent to draw
invidious comparisons or to imply
that there are no major differences
or to suggest that anyone is to blame
because lawyers are not held in the
same high esteem which the doctors
enjoy. I can only mention one aspect
of a large problem, namely, that
medicine rests on science and is it-
self, to a substantial degree, a science,
whereas the practice of the law does
not even pretend to rest on organized
empirical knowledge. For three cen-
turies science has received the su-
preme accolade of Western culture,
and medicine participates in that
prestige. Nor is it merely a matter
of public esteem. The reputation is
deserved because the doctors are con-
tributing to our knowledge of health
in many important ways. The con-
quest of disease by scientific methods
is universally appreciated as are pre-
ventive medicine and the efforts of
doctors to educate the public. The
clinic and the laboratory and the
scientific medical publications are
established and highly regarded.
Granted that law is fundamentally
different in important regards, it is
nonetheless pertinent to consider the
possible significance of research and
legal science for the practice of law.
This is not an easy problem because
(Continued on page 85)
